Murky waters off Leyte: Q+A: Mark Stille 

History’s largest sea battle, and the destruction of the Imperial Japanese Navy, has been the subject of heated debate and misleading mythology  

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The Battle of Leyte Gulf was the climactic naval engagement of the Pacific Campaign. Leading the Japanese First Diversion Attack Force, Admiral Takeo Kurita attempted to enter Leyte Gulf and disrupt the ongoing US amphibious invasion of Leyte Island. Admiral William Halsey and the United States Third Fleet stood in his way. Across four battles – Sibuyan Sea, Surigao Strait, Cape Engaño and Samar – the US won a decisive victory and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) would never again carry out large operations. 

Leyte Gulf is now among the most highly mythologised battles in US history, as covered by Mark Stille in his book Leyte Gulf: A New History of the World’s Largest Sea Battle. Speaking with History of War, Stille discussed Leyte Gulf’s mythology, the significant engagements and how Leyte Gulf impacted the IJN’s capabilities. 

What were the main objectives planned by the Japanese in Sho-1?

The Japanese had an elaborate plan to defeat the American invasion of the Philippines. The author of this plan was Admiral Soemu Toyoda who was head of the Combined Fleet. He came up with this plan under the notion that he had to use the fleet or he’s gonna lose it. It was a plan of desperation and had two main objectives. The first one was that they were going to fight a decisive battle which ran deep in the DNA of the Japanese Navy. This was totally fallacious at this point in the war. By making an all-out effort, the Japanese could bring 69 ships, destroyer size and above, to the battle. The US Navy had 235 ships in the battle and a gross advantage in aircraft. 

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The other goal was to stop the American invasion of the Philippines. To do that, they’d have to hit the amphibious assault force before it landed or right after it hit the beachheads. The Americans landed on 20 October. For a number of reasons, some of which are just sloppy work from the Japanese, they couldn’t get a reaction force there until 25 October when the invasion had already succeeded. The Americans had 132,000 men on Leyte. On both counts, Sho-Go, the Japanese victory operation, was a non-starter.

What do you think has become the most pervasive or frustrating myth surrounding Leyte Gulf?

Samuel Eliot Morison, the dean of American naval historians, wrote his account of the battle not long after the war. The myths he included in the history have survived intact today. Once mythology starts, it’s very hard to dispel. There are three main myths which are fairly well-known by people with a knowledge of the battle. The first is that Halsey’s move to go north against the Japanese diversion force was a stupid decision. This is him leaving San Bernardino state unguarded, which was the entrance into the Philippine Sea that the Japanese were going to use, to attack an intact Japanese carrier force on 25 October. I don’t condemn Halsey for making a decision to go north on 25 October, but he did handle his force very poorly before and after that decision. 

Another myth is about Kurita’s decision at the same time Halsey was deciding whether to go north or guard the Strait. Kurita decided not to press into Leyte Gulf. A corollary to that is had he decided to go into the Gulf, he could have achieved a great victory. That’s utter nonsense.

The last myth is one that’s still alive today. It’s about the engagement off Samar fought on 25 October that preceded Kurita’s decision not to press into the Gulf or not. The central position of the myth is that American destroyers fought off Japanese battleships. There’s much more to that victory.

What critical events in the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea are often overlooked or forgotten?

That’s the first of the four main engagements that make up the Battle of Leyte Gulf, taking place on 24 October. As Kurita was making his way from the Singapore area to Leyte Gulf, he had to get there through the Subiyan Sea, which went about as well as the Japanese could have hoped.

At Subiyan Sea, Task Force 38 had only one group of carriers within a range of Kurita’s force. The bottom line is that on 24 October, the US could only launch 252 sorties against Kurita. That sounds like a lot but it wasn’t enough against a force of five battleships and 10 heavy cruisers. To make matters worse for the Americans, they over concentrated on one ship, the superbattleship Musashi which was the sister ship to the better known Yamato. Musashi was able to absorb a lot of punishment, between 11 and 15 torpedo hits and 16 bomb hits, before she was finally sunk. Other than that, the Americans could only force one. heavy cruiser back with a torpedo. Subiyan Sea, counterintuitively, was a tactical defeat for the Americans. The Japanese main force, which had no air cover, was still combat effective and still on course for Leyte Gulf.

To read our full interview with Mark Stille, including his thoughts on Admiral Kurita’s controversial decision not to enter Leyte Gulf, pick up issue 138 of History of War